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Abstract
Start-up incubators are one of a number of micropolicy interventions used by states to support their technology
entrepreneurs. Since 2000, the number of incubators in the United States has almost trebled while that in Europe has
more than doubled. This article outlines the challenges involved in attempting to evaluate the contribution of the higher
education technology start-up incubator process. It advocates theory-based evaluation (TBE) methodology as a possible
solution for effective evaluation (and policy learning) in complex research settings such as this, where a study is unable, for
myriad reasons, to meet the stringent requirements of experimental research design. TBE delivers findings on the
contribution of the multiple factors influencing a result, thus showing whether the incubation process made a
contribution to an observed result and in what way. An exploratory case study is used in this article to illustrate how
the proposed TBE approach could work.
Keywords
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If a country is to grow and develop economically, its ability
to nurture the development of young high-growth firms is
perhaps the most important element in enterprise policy
(Storey and Greene, 2010). However, Storey (1998) notes
that, in general, there is a dearth of evidence to support
‘direct’ state intervention in firms with high growth potential. Indeed, in the case of state-funded Business Incubation
Centres (BICs), there are ‘very real methodological problems in linking the provision of incubator support to subsequent economic outcomes’ (Storey and Greene, 2010:
450). As a result, there is a gulf between our understanding
of the need for such entrepreneurship policies and of how
such policies might be conceived and designed if needed
(Karlsson and Andersson, 2009: 127). Furthermore, public
money should be spent on entrepreneurship and small and
medium-sized enterprise (SME) support, it is essential that
rigorous evaluation of the contribution of these initiatives
takes place to aid policy learning. Regardless, the evaluation of policy performance is important for public transparency and accountability; otherwise, a government can
simply ‘set sketchy objectives’ and ‘claim that the target
is anything it happens to hit’ (Mayne, 2012: 10).

This article therefore investigates how the contribution
of the start-up incubation process to the co-production of
knowledge, innovation and growth can be evaluated. The
structure of this article is as follows. The next section is a
literature review on ‘Supporting entrepreneurs and SMEs –
policy rationale and policy context’. It is divided into nine
subsections, which outline the theoretical and empirical
literature and also the rationale and context for state intervention through incubators based in higher education (HE)
institutions. This is followed by an illustrative case study of
a national incubation programme – branded ‘New Frontiers’ – implemented through the Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT), which includes a subsection on the case
research methodology employed in the evaluation of the
incubation process. This article concludes with a discussion
of the exploratory research findings and a recommendation
for future research in the start-up incubator domain.
Corresponding author:
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Supporting entrepreneurs and
SMEs – Policy rationale and context
Government policy aimed at supporting the development
and growth of SMEs and entrepreneurs can be broadly
categorized into macro- and micro-level policy measures. Micropolicies focus specifically on SMEs and
entrepreneurs, while macropolicies ‘do not have SMEs
or entrepreneurs as their primary focus’ (Storey and
Greene, 2010: 407).

Macro-level policy
Macropolicies sit within a country’s institutional framework
and generally include four key components: (i) macroeconomic stability and regulation, business climate, trade policy
and FDI policy; (ii) policies on competition and monopoly;
(iii) government economic agency (taxation, public services
and expenditures, employment, contracting and social policy); and (iv) government economic strategy, planning and
promotion, contribution to the knowledge economy, technology and innovation (Bennett, 2014: 17).
Macroeconomic policies are therefore aimed at improving the broader economic conditions through a plethora of
policy measures and in myriad ways. Many of these policies can indirectly have positive or negative influences on
SME and entrepreneurial development.

Micro-level policy
Micropolicies targeted at start-ups and entrepreneurs ‘are
those which endeavour to support the start-up and growth
of businesses by providing direct assistance to the individuals or businesses concerned’ (Bridge and O’Neill, 2013:
323). Such direct assistance or ‘intervention’ from the government is normally justified on the grounds of ‘market
failure’; that is, where there are barriers to entry and exit,
information imperfections, the presence of externalities
(knowledge, network or learning spill-overs) and where
willingness to pay does not reflect demand (Storey and
Greene, 2010). In other words, the government must have
a case to intervene in the market mechanism in order to
make it work better (Storey and Greene, 2010: 381–385).
One of the key issues in micropolicy intervention is
whether a government can intervene cost-effectively, with
market failure alone not a necessary or sufficient justification for intervention (Storey, 2008). This is compounded by
a lack of empirical support for micropolicy intervention in
the literature (Bannock, 2005; Bennett, 2014; Bridge et al.,
2013; Davidsson et al., 2008; Storey and Greene, 2010).
Storey (2008) remarks that this lack of theoretical or
empirical support for micropolicy intervention is noteworthy also for the paucity of rigorous evaluation of these
enterprise policies. Indeed, the OECD (2007) provides
seven areas under which policy can be evaluated: rationale,
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additionality, appropriateness, superiority, systemic efficiency, own efficiency and adaptive efficiency – arguing,
however, that ‘at the core of evaluation is the concept of
additionality’ (OECD, 2007: 16). ‘Additionality’ is thus an
appropriate moniker for the attempts by researchers to try
to quantify the impact or contribution of an intervention
compared to a ‘counterfactual’ situation (Oldsman and Halberg, 2002).
Micropolicy instruments aimed at developing entrepreneurs and SMEs are broadly subsumed under the term
‘enterprise policy’. Enterprise policy is often then justified
on the basis that it helps to stimulate and/or facilitate entrepreneurial activity, which in turn can provide key benefits
to national economies such as job generation, innovation,
productivity and growth. On an individual level, this support can also help entrepreneurs to develop their ‘utility’
function by increasing, for example, their satisfaction or
income (Van Praag and Versloot, 2007). While rigorous
and elaborate frameworks have been developed for evaluating enterprise policy (see OECD, 2004), these have proven difficult to implement in practice and therefore there is
a dearth of empirical evidence to support or justify micropolicy intervention.

SME and entrepreneurship policy
Bridge and O’Neill (2013: 301) point out that ‘there is often
confusion about what is meant by [SME and entrepreneurship] policies’ as there is ‘a lack of clear definitions of both
words’. Storey (1998: 6) notes ‘the important distinction
between [these terms] in which [SME policy] applies to
existing enterprises whereas [entrepreneurship policy]
relates to policies seeking to enhance the creation of such
enterprises’.
SME policies are designed to stimulate the growth of
already established small businesses ‘and tend to focus on
the businesses and what will help them grow, not the entrepreneurs behind them’ (Bridge and O’Neill, 2013: 301). On
the other hand, entrepreneurship policies are aimed at
‘encouraging and facilitating more people to create their
own businesses’ and ‘are centred on people and on what
will persuade or help them to start businesses’ (Bridge and
O’Neill, 2013: 301).
In the context of publicly sponsored business start-up
incubation, the distinction between enterprise and SME
policy is even more unclear, considering that this support
is aimed at helping to transform entrepreneurs into successful start-up companies. As a result, incubation programmes
typically straddle both categories, providing a combination
of support and services that fall within both camps.

Policy rationale for business start-up incubation
The rationale for business start-up incubators to target new
technology and service-based firms (NTBFs) is that
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‘policy-makers view high-technology sectors as the main
generators of potential high-growth firms or Gazelles’
(Mason and Brown, 2013: 214). Start-up incubators are one
of a number of micropolicy interventions with which
states attempt – primarily through publicly funded HE
institutions – to support technology entrepreneurs to
develop and commercialize their innovations. Incubator
numbers have grown globally from their first appearance
in the United States in the 1950s (driven initially by urban
renewal projects) to over 2300 in the United States and
Europe currently. Since 2000, the number of incubators
in the United States has almost trebled while that in Europe
has more than doubled (Bruneel et al., 2012). This post2000 growth has been driven primarily by technology startup incubators, with these HE-based incubators seen as
important conduits for developing knowledge economies
and for local and regional economic growth (Etzkowitz
et al., 2000; Link and Siegel, 2007).
Business incubators aim to stimulate and support entrepreneurs and start-ups (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005: 111)
through the provision of support that provides a ‘safe harbour’ for firms to develop their internal resources – the
so-called ‘buffering’ – while also connecting them with
external resources and networks – referred to as ‘bridging’
(Amezcua et al., 2013: 1633). Buffering allows fledgling
firms and entrepreneurs to isolate themselves from the
environment for a defined period. This gives them space
to engage in formational and developmental activities without having to confront directly ‘general and specific environmental threats’ (Amezcua et al., 2013: 1633). Bridging,
on the other hand, allows them to engage actively, rather
than be isolated from their external environment, to build
assets that will hopefully allow for the development of
sustainable competitive advantage (Amezcua et al., 2013:
1629) and company value creation (Davidsson et al., 2008).

Measuring incubator performance
Ramsden and Bennett (2005: 229) differentiate between
objective ‘hard’ and subjective ‘soft’ performance (impact)
criteria. The former refers to outcomes such as reduction in
business costs, increase in business turnover and increase in
business profitability, while the latter refers to outcomes
such as the ‘ability to cope with problems’ and the ‘ability
to manage’. Voisey et al. (2006: 465) argue that business
incubators must demonstrate their success in the quantitative terms of ‘hard measures’ as well as in ‘soft benefits’
such as increased business knowledge and skills, business
awareness and client networking improvements. In parallel, the incubator must meet its own ‘hard’ targets as agreed
with its key stakeholders. Stephens and Onofrei (2012)
identified four additional hard measures of success (location/incubation space, success in entrepreneurial competitions, securing public funding and customer retention) and
three additional soft measures (increased productivity due
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to incubation structures, networking and a positive image
associated with being on a recognized programme). These
authors advocate ‘a holistic approach to the measurement
and evaluation of business incubation [ . . . ] utliliz[ing]
hard and soft measures’ (Stephens and Onofrei, 2012: 283).
Incubator performance measures have been widely discussed and the topic has generated debate among researchers. However, the literature has yet to arrive at even a broad
consensus on what constitute appropriate measures of performance (Barbero et al., 2012; 891) beyond the general
categories of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’.

Isolating the contribution of business incubation
Business incubators purport to add value in a number of
ways, but their main value proposition is to help new and
fledgling ventures survive and grow in the early stages of
operation (Hamdani, 2006: 17). Voisey et al. (2006: 459)
suggest that the business incubation process creates value
through the diagnosis of business needs, the selection and
monitored application of business services, the provision of
financing and providing access to the incubator network.
Bruneel et al. (2012: 111) further describe the value proposition of incubators as having four key components: the
existence of scale economies which reduce tenants’ overhead costs (e.g. water, electricity, cleaning); the provision
of services to which the firms would not otherwise have
access during such early developmental stages (e.g. meeting rooms, reception services and private parking); a
reduced burden of planning as firms do not have to put
effort and time into managing such services; and the benefits that incubatees receive from the subsidy generating
capacity of the business incubator. Hughes et al. (2007:
170) place the onus on the incubatee for deriving benefit
from an incubation programme, taking the view that ‘firms
benefit from incubation to the extent that they behave in
ways that enable them to seize network opportunities and
make use of networked resources and knowledge’, that is,
by developing social capital.
It is therefore clear from the literature to date that not
only is there little consensus around performance metrics,
other than the need for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures, but there
is also some disagreement on the actual services and support that the typical technology incubator should provide.
Evaluating the incubation process – and indeed the rationale for it – is therefore complex. The evaluation process is
further complicated by the unit of analysis – the technology
start-up – which, in the words of Blank (2010: 1), is ‘an
organization formed to search for a repeatable and scalable
business model’. What co-produced outputs, outcomes and
longer term impacts are stakeholders seeking from the
incubation process? Can we find agreement on its role and
contribution to societal value creation?
For any given outcome, therefore, a ‘policy impact can
be considered as the difference between the observed
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Table 1. The COTE framework.

Component
Clarity and coherence

Objectives

Targets
Evaluation

Description
The policy should be clear to those delivering and benefiting from it, and
should be delivered in a ‘unifying and mutually reinforcing’ way by
governments.
Objectives of the policy, such as the creation of new firms or employment
creation, should be clearly specified. According to Lenihan (2011: 330), a
logic model outlining a theory of change for the programme should be
Feedback
mapped out to ‘ensure from the outset that objectives are well specified,
Loop
and that issues of opportunity cost regarding public funds are addressed’.
Measurable ‘targets’ reflecting the policy objectives should be specified,
e.g. to increase the number of new firms by x% by 2016.
‘Policy can only be considered to be effective if it passes the challenges of
high level evaluation, but evaluation can only be undertaken when clear
policy targets exist.’ The OECD (2004: 16) emphasizes the importance of
feedback in this process, stating that ‘implementing evaluation as a
process can be achieved, by feeding the results of evaluation back into
the debate, once the evaluation is complete.’ This helps to increase policy
learning.

Source: Adapted from Storey (2008: 13–14).
Note: ToC: theory of change.

outcome with the intervention, and what would have happened without the intervention (the counterfactual)’; that is,
the ‘additionality’ of the intervention (Storey, 2008: 16). In
order to isolate the effects of public micropolicy instruments, such as technology incubation, and to determine
incremental value creation (additionality), it is essential
that such policies have measurable objectives and targets
from the outset. Otherwise, they may produce unwanted
effects. Storey and Greene (2010: 384–385) highlight two
unintended consequences of government micropolicies
such as incubation – ‘deadweight’, when a business would
have set up even if the support had not been available, and
‘displacement’, when a new business displaces incumbents
in the industry with no net economic benefit to the state.

The COTE framework
In June 2004, a background report prepared for the second
OECD Conference of Ministers for SMEs set out the
clarity/coherence, objectives, targets, evaluation (COTE)
Framework, designed to ensure that ‘all SME and Entrepreneurship policies and programmes [should] have clear
objectives and targets’ (OECD, 2004: 16). The components of the COTE Framework are outlined in Table 1.

Designing evaluation and performance measurement
for incubators
Evaluation ‘seeks to determine [ . . . ] the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of an activity in terms of its objectives’ (Papaconstantinou and Polt, 1997: 10). However, in

reality, effective programme evaluation is very difficult to
achieve and ‘only rarely, do we see the application of evaluation methodologies which address the effects of selection bias and incorporate appropriate counterfactual
scenarios’ (Lenihan et al., 2007: 313). Lenihan et al.
(2007: 313) complain that, ‘Too often, evaluation studies
[of public policy instruments] do not get beyond first base
because they focus on resource inputs and monitoring
impacts of particular programmes, schemes and initiatives
with little reference either to context or longer-term outcomes’. Stame (2010: 62) also does not provide comfort in
this domain when he asserts that ‘black box’ or experimental forms of evaluation (where possible) are equally deficient because of the ‘successionist theory of causality’ on
which experiments are based. They do not tell us why
something changed, only that something has changed, thus
making it difficult to say whether or not the change can be
attributed to the programme.
Given its complex research setting and the multiple
intervening variables before an outcome, it would appear
that incubation programme evaluation is not particularly
suited to the exacting requirements of a true experimental
‘black box’ impact evaluation requiring the establishment
of counterfactuals, valid control groups and randomization.
For this reason, and on the basis that ‘strong theoretical
underpinnings give rise to robust evaluation methodologies’ (Lenihan, 2011: 330), theory-based evaluation (TBE)
appears to be a more appropriate methodology for evaluating an incubation programme. Proponents of ‘new’ programme evaluation, such as Lenihan et al. (2007), are
calling for new methodologies to be adopted by public
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programme evaluators. Methodologies such as theorybased approaches map out a clear theory of change (ToC)
(Weiss, 1995) and therefore allow for multiple or mixed
research methodologies to be deployed within the broader
framework (Funnel and Rogers, 2011). This methodological dexterity opens up the possibility for micropolicy
instruments to be evaluated in a broadly consistent manner,
as TBE involves examining the assumptions underlying a
causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impact (White,
2009: 3) or contribution (Mayne, 2001, 2008, 2012).

Incubator evaluation metrics using TBE
Grappling with the complexity of the microintervention
process, Lenihan (2011) suggests that ‘new’ enterprise policy interventions such as technology incubation programmes should encompass a wide array of evaluation
metrics. She provides a list of 12 (hard and soft) policy
evaluation metrics but does not provide guidance on how
policy interventions can be evaluated against these metrics
or empirical evidence of similar evaluations. McLaughlin
and Jordan (2004: 7) propose that a logic model ToC is
useful for designing evaluation and performance measurement as it focuses on the important elements of a programme and helps to identify what evaluation questions
should be asked and what performance measures should
be used. Lenihan (2011: 330) further notes that: ‘wellconstructed logic models can serve as ex-post measures
to see whether objectives have been attained, enabling
robust ex-post evaluations’ that can ultimately feed back
into future programme design.
TBE involves examining the assumptions underlying a
causal chain from inputs to outcomes and impact (White,
2009: 3). The theory-driven method is based on the rationale that ‘evaluation should not be dictated or driven by one
particular [research] method’ (Chen, 2015: 25) and that ‘the
success of a programme has to be judged not only by its
results but also by its context’ (Chen, 2015: 26).

Evaluating the technology incubation
process using TBE
Five interrelated areas are generally evaluated by TBEs.
These are detailed below.
Inputs are ‘resources dedicated to or consumed by the
program’ (Chen, 2015: 60) and in the case of an incubator
are aimed at ‘developing a supportive environment by providing access to opportunities, resources and support services’ (Stephens and Onfrei, 2012: 279). According to
Hackett and Dilts (2004a: 43), ‘a lack of inputs such as
capable entrepreneurs [ . . . ] might go a long way toward
explaining why many incubators perform so poorly’. The
entrepreneurs themselves are also a fundamental input,
while the opportunity cost of accepting one entrepreneur
over another applicant can also be considered a negative
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input. The incubation inputs will directly influence the
level of activities that can be undertaken within an incubation programme. In addition, the characteristics of the participating entrepreneurs represent a further input into the
process at the pre-start-up phase (Smallbone and Wyer,
2012; Storey, 1994; Storey and Greene, 2010).
Activities (processes) ‘are what the program does with
the inputs to fulfill its mission’ (Chen, 2015: 60), and in an
incubator include the professional services, opportunities
and informal networking environment designed to ‘facilitate knowledge and training’ (Stephens and Onfrei, 2012:
279). The activities undertaken are designed to produce
highly capable entrepreneurs and ‘gazelles’ – start-ups with
high growth potential (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010).
These activities will also influence the characteristics of
the firm at start-up.
Outputs are the ‘direct products of program activities’
(Chen, 2015: 60) and primarily include the company, as
ultimately the incubator ‘is a manufacturer of new firms’
(Hackett and Dilts, 2004a: 43), and also the graduating
entrepreneur. The characteristics of the firm resulting from
these activities will heavily influence its growth potential,
which will be largely determined by the management strategies implemented after start-up (Storey and Greene,
2010).
Outcomes represent ‘the benefits for participants during
and after program activities’ (Chen, 2015: 60) and will be
heavily influenced by the success (or failure) of subsequent
management strategies. The benefit to the individual participant will more likely be denoted by learning or ‘soft’
outcomes, while benefits for the firm will likely be indicated through ‘hard’ financial performance or employment
growth. The management strategies adopted will also be
heavily influenced by external environmental factors (Gibb
and Davies, 1990).
Long-term impact is the ultimate impact of the technology incubation. This classically takes in the value creation
from the particular incubation programme. Results available to date for incubation programmes are usually selfreported and therefore lack methodological rigour and/or
reliable data. There is a need for independent evaluation of
incubation programmes – particularly technology incubators. In the absence of reliable, independent empirical evidence, a herd mentality appears to have taken hold among
policymakers worldwide in relation to technology incubators and science parks in particular.
An illustrative logic map and ToC for technology incubation is set out in Figure 1. The broken line in the figure
represents a feedback loop and conveys how the logic
model can serve as a highly effective ex post evaluation
method by aiding policymakers in the ‘classification of
options for setting priorities and supporting effective allocation of resources’ (Lenihan, 2011: 382). In other words,
by monitoring the outcomes of the programme, it allows
policymakers and programme coordinators to manipulate
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Pre-Start-Up

At Start-Up

Entrepreneur characteriscs

Firm characteriscs

Policy Recommendaons

Post-Start-Up
Outcomes (hard):
Independent trading
Survival (or failure)
Sales turnover
Proﬁts
Shareholder value creaon
Exports
Employment creaon
Investment
Economies of scale & scope
Compeveness
Growth

Acvies
Inputs:
Entrepreneurs
Time
Money
Staﬀ
Oﬃce space
Selecon process

(Transformaon Process)

Training
Workshops
Events
Mentoring
Networking
Introducons
Business plan development
Idea validaon

Outputs:
Enhanced competencies
High-potenal start-ups

External environment

Policy Recommendaons

Management strategies

Outcomes (so):
Enhanced knowledge
Acquired skills
Professionalism
Publicity
Networks
Conﬁdence
Innovaveness
Entrepreneurial orientaon
Employment opportunies

Time in incubaon
Figure 1. A logic model and ToC for business incubation.
Source: Buckley (2014: 4), Hackett and Dilts (2004a: 44), Lenihan (2011: 329), Smallbone and Wyer (2012), Storey and Greene (2010)
and Voisey et al. (2006: 465). ToC: theory of change.

the inputs and activities in an attempt to achieve the desired
outcomes for future programmes. If deadweight is a major
concern for the programme evaluator, then a ‘control
group’ (of non-incubator participants with a similar profile)
can be established to compare and contrast the outputs and
outcomes over a common period. Similarly, when possible
displacement issues are identified, incubatee support can be
evaluated in the context of the sectoral structures existing
in the state. Small open states tend to directly support
export-oriented firms only to try to minimize the effects
of displacement.

Research methodology
In adopting a TBE methodology, it was determined that a
case-based research approach was most appropriate given
the data available, the time frame within which the

research was to be conducted and the technology incubator cohort size. This section outlines the methodological
approach and details the individual stages in the research
process from the development of theory, selection of cases
and design of research protocols to the conducting of case
studies and drafting of individual case reports for crosscase analysis.

Case study research method
A case study is a method for developing a complete understanding of a process, programme, event or activity
(Martinson and O’Brien, 2010: 163). Yin provides a more
elaborate ‘two-fold technical definition’ that focuses first
on the scope, followed by the technical characteristics of a
case study:

Buckley and Davis
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MASTER CASE
Naonal Campus Incubaon programme – New Froners
EMBEDDED CASE
Dublin Instute of Technology Hothouse incubator
Mulple case analysis
Hothouse incubatees

Figure 2. Case study research approach.
Source: Adapted from Yin (2018).
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and
context are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes
with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one
result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing
to converge in a triangulating fashion and as another result
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions
to guide data collection and analysis. (Yin, 2009: 18)

Case studies can be used to provide description, to test
theory or to generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534).
According to Martinson and O’Brien (2010: 164), they can
be descriptive, explanatory or exploratory. The present
research focus is exploratory, meaning that it is aimed at
‘defining the questions and hypotheses of a subsequent and
larger study’ (Martinson and O’Brien, 2010: 164).
The overall research approach is an embedded, singlecase design (Yin, 2018: 48–53). It is a case study of
Ireland’s campus-based, publicly funded technology incubator programme, ‘New Frontiers’, managed by the economic development agency Enterprise Ireland. Within this
master case is embedded a subsidiary case study of 1 of the
21 higher education institutes (HEIs) implementing the
national programme – the DIT with its technology incubator (DIT Hothouse). And within this embedded case is a
multiple cross-case analysis (Yin, 2018: 58) of the experience of incubator participants in the New Frontiers programme in the DIT Hothouse incubator. This multilevel
case-based approach is an appropriate research design
when exploring the complexities of how the start-up incubation process contributes to the co-production of knowledge, innovation and growth. This approach is illustrated in
Figure 2.

Illustrative case – New Frontiers
The Irish Government has identified six key areas; it is
seeking to develop via a combination of macroeconomic
and microeconomic policies in its attempts to create a
vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem in Ireland. These are

culture, human capital and education; business environment and support; innovation; access to finance; entrepreneurial networks and mentoring; and access to markets
(National Policy Statement on Entrepreneurship in Ireland,
2014: 8).
In relation to micropolicies, there are a large number of
specific supports directly available to entrepreneurs in Ireland. The Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation (DBEI) provides 170 specific individual enterprise
policy instruments, reflecting perhaps the absence of coherence and clarity (and rigorous evaluation) in the overall
enterprise strategy to date (see DBEI, 2017). Enterprise Ireland, the government’s implementation agency responsible
for the development and growth of Irish enterprises in world
markets, delivers a range of these supports, including the
New Frontiers start-up incubation programme. The list of
Enterprise Ireland supports, a description of each and the
available exchequer funding for each is provided in Table 2.
From the list of entrepreneur support mechanisms identified in Table 2, ‘Incubation Centres’ and ‘New Frontiers’
constitute the extent of publicly sponsored support for startup incubation in Ireland. Between 2013 and 2014, a total of
€8.1 million of exchequer funding was appropriated to
funding these incubation programmes. Based on Enterprise
Ireland’s budget of €219 million for enterprise development in 2014, incubation represents approximately 3.7%
of expenditure (Enterprise Ireland, 2014: 11).

Technology business incubation in Ireland
In Ireland, the national publicly sponsored incubation programme, New Frontiers, has been delivered through the
government’s economic development agency, Enterprise
Ireland, since 2012. The programme, like its predecessors,
offers structured training, mentoring, networking opportunities, financial assistance and shared incubation space
(De Faoite et al., 2004: 442) and ‘provide[s] entrepreneurs
with a supportive environment that assists them in bringing
their idea to market, aimed at helping to reduce the risk
aversion to failure’ (Forfas, 2014: 119).

Campus incubator performance: Empirical
Irish evidence
Empirical studies conducted by Forfas (2014) and Stephens
and Onofrei (2012) have attempted to estimate the impact
of the campus incubation programmes. The findings of
these studies are included in Table 3. Neither study
employs rigorous evaluation methodologies and both
depend heavily on participant feedback when drawing their
conclusions. Academics and professionals researching and
practising in the evaluation domain would recognize this
approach as a form of ‘monitoring’ and not as evaluation
per se.
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Table 2. Enterprise Ireland entrepreneurship supports.
Support

Description

Funding

€90,000 (2013)
Provide entrepreneurs with comprehensive information to understand the business
development process including the key success factors and potential pitfalls as well as
an outline of financial supports available from Enterprise Ireland and Local Enterprise
Office.
Mentor Programme
Mentors provide advice, guidance and support, to help clients grow and build capability. €571,000 (2013)
Competitive Feasibility Aimed at assisting entrepreneurs to investigate the viability of a new growth-oriented
€1.0 m (2013)
Funds
business that can succeed in global markets.
HPSU Feasibility Study Funding to investigate the viability and potential of an innovative/high-potential start-up
€2.6 m (2013)
and the development of an investor ready business plan.
Competitive Start
Aims to assist start-ups to bridge the equity gap and quickly validate their market.
€4.3 m (2013)
Fund
Innovative HPSU
Equity investment for HPSU clients, on a co-funded basis to support the implementation €21.7 m (2013)
Programme
of company business plans.
€15.7 m (2013)
Commercialization
Drives the commercialization of research from HE research institutions by supporting
Fund
the development of innovations at all stages of the commercial pipeline to the point
where they can be commercialized as new products, services and companies.
Technology Incubation Providing an essential transitional space between the research and business worlds.
€2.0 m (2013)
Centres
Community Enterprise Provide entrepreneurs with business space in a supportive environment with the aim €64 m (since 1989)
Centres
developing entrepreneurship in both urban and rural locations.
€59 m invested in
Seed and Venture
Aims to increase the availability of risk capital for SMEs to support economic growth
Irish companies
Capital Scheme:
through the continued development of the Seed and Venture Capital Sector in Ireland
to achieve a more robust, commercially viable and sustainable sector.
€6.1 m paid (June
New Frontiers
National incubation programme launched in 2012 that offers participants a package of
2014)
Programme
supports to help accelerate their business development and to equip them with the
skills to successfully start and grow a company.
EnterpriseSTART
Workshops

Source: National Policy Statement on Entrepreneurship in Ireland (2014: 62–64).
Note: HE: higher education.

A study by Ryan and Wright investigating the experiences of incubated companies in Cork and Waterford Institutes of Technology (IoTs) found a number of prevalent
themes that highlighted the experience of participants
(Ryan and Wright, 2009: 76). These key themes are outlined in Table 4.
Thus, in line with international evidence and experience,
Ireland, like other smaller states, has not yet developed a
strong culture of rigorous evaluation (as part of the policy
learning process) nor has the academic research community
yet found this a fruitful area to research. Consequently, the
empirical evidence base is weak with only a small number
of monitoring studies having been conducted so far.

New Frontiers (2012–)
New Frontiers was launched in February 2012 with the aim
of supporting the establishment and growth of technologyintensive or knowledge-intensive ventures with the
potential to trade internationally and create employment
in Ireland (DIT Hothouse, 2015). As already noted, the
programme is funded and coordinated by Enterprise Ireland
and is delivered at the local level by the 15 IoTs. It provides
aspiring entrepreneurs with a package of support that
includes funding of €15,000, office space, mentoring and

workshops to help accelerate their business development
(Enterprise Ireland, 2014: 31). New Frontiers standardized
the provision of campus incubation services across the HEI
sector. Figure 3 graphically represents the geographical
location of each of the New Frontiers Campus Incubation
Centres. New Frontiers is delivered by the HEIs in three
phases, as detailed below.

Phases in the New Frontiers programme
The New Frontiers incubation programme consists of three
phases:
 Phase 1: Delivered part-time (2 days per week) over
a 10-week period to help validate the potential of the
business idea.
 Phase 2: Participation is determined via a competitive selection process and requires successful applicants to be based in the campus incubation centre
full-time for 6 months. The aim is to assist in the
development of an investor-ready business-plan.
 Phase 3: This provides Phase 2 graduates with the
option to avail themselves of incubation facilities for
up to a further 3 months. The aim is to assist entrepreneurs in developing their business and client bases.
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Table 3. Empirical findings on Irish campus incubation outcomes.
Study/
researchers

Review
period

1999–2007
Campus
Incubation
Programme
Review,
Forfas
(2014)

BIC Study,
Stephens
and Onofrei
(2012)

2012

Greatest benefit
Sample (% as expressed
size by sample)
149

43

Short term:
Increase in company value
(30%)
New domestic sales (27%)
and New export sales
(17%)
Increased export volumes
(13%) (p. 127)
Long term:
Improved business
capabilities (73%)
Ability to attract highly
skilled staff (40%)
Better technological skills
(38%)
Greater higher level skills
(23%) (p. 128)
Hard benefits:
Enterprise growth (79%)
Reduced reliance on
incubation support (51%)
Improved sales or
profitability (35%) (p. 281)
Soft benefits:
Confidence, networking
and business knowledge
(79%)
Cost savings due to
incubation resources
(70%)
Increased positive publicity
(42%) (p. 282)

Source: Forfas, 2014; Stephens and Onofrei, 2012.
Note: BIC: Business Incubation Centre.

Phase 2 represents the most intensive incubation phase
of the programme and is therefore the focus of this
research, with all entrepreneurs and firms involved in the
research sample having participated in and graduated from
this phase. The mentoring and support delivered throughout
Phase 2 are oriented to helping new firms, on graduation
from the programme, to achieve public equity investment
from the following sources:
 Competitive start fund: A €50,000 equity investment designed to accelerate the development of
high-potential start-up companies by helping them
to achieve commercial and technical milestones,
such as evaluating international market opportunities or building a prototype (Enterprise Ireland,
2015).
 Innovative high potential start-up (HPSU) fund:
Equity investment, on a co-funded basis to support

Table 4. Experience of participants in campus incubation
programmes.
Theme

Explanation

Networking
opportunities

Informal, internal networking among
participants through common facilities such
as ‘the canteen’ was emphasized as a clear
value-creating activity, ‘particularly where
there are opportunities to work together’
(p. 77)
There is a ‘huge advantage being able to work
with other companies of the same stage of
development’ and ‘helping each other’
which ‘provides the potential to generate
new ideas’ (p. 77)
The companies’ relationship with the
incubation centre manager is cited as being
of ‘strategic importance’, particularly in
linking client companies with the institutes
(p. 77)
Providing incubated companies with easy
access to the ‘knowledge, facilities and
[potential] labour force’ in the IoTs and the
relationships between the incubator and
academic staff ‘played a key role in attracting
several client companies to both incubators’
(p.78)
A ‘cultural disconnect’ was highlighted
between the incubated companies and
academic staff, particularly ‘a different
mindset towards meeting deliverables and
deadlines’ (p. 79). This may be explained by
the assertion that ‘academic staff are not
appropriately rewarded for actively
engaging with industry, and therefore not
motivated’ (p.80)
‘Funding’ and ‘increased sales revenues’ were
highlighted as the biggest challenges the
incubated companies faced, and the financial
and infrastructural assistance of incubation
enabled them to manage their cash flows
and finances (p. 80)
The younger incubated companies (less than 1
year) typically rely on incubator staff to fulfil
their managerial functions, such as
identifying funding, arranging business
meetings and recruitment of staff/students
for their business (p. 78)

Co-location and
mutual trust

Relationship with
incubation
manager

Physical
proximity to
the institute

Active
collaboration
not supported
by all academic
staff

Financial
assistance,
physical space
and
infrastructure
Managerial
functions

Source: Ryan and Wright, 2009.

the implementation of a company’s business plan.
Investment is generally provided by Enterprise Ireland on a ‘match-funding’ basis; that is, at the same
level as funding contributed by the business owners
(Enterprise Ireland, 2015).
Table 5 provides a full list of supports provided to participants in New Frontiers Phase 2 throughout the 6-month
duration.
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Figure 3. Location of new frontiers campus incubation centres.
Source: Enterprise Ireland (2015).

‘Based on the [perceived] success of [its] first year
[ . . . ] a further €12.65 m [was] invested [by Enterprise
Ireland] for the next three years of New Frontiers’
(Enterprise Ireland, 2013: 31). Given the relatively short
time for which the New Frontiers programme has been
in operation (less than 5 years at the time of writing), it
is not yet possible to evaluate its long-term impact.
According to the Forfas’ (2014) report commissioned
by Enterprise Ireland, the programme is succeeding in
terms of employment creation, good incubation practice
is in evidence and the overall programme is delivering
results, albeit ‘at a relatively early stage of a long term,
strategic programme’ (Forfas, 2014: 134). However, it is
evident from the empirical studies and state reports

outlined so far that there is a dearth of rigorous programme evaluation – rather the outcomes of these incubation programmes have simply been monitored and not
evaluated, with no attempt to identify the ‘additionality’
delivered by the incubation process.

DIT hothouse incubation performance,
2001–2011
Between 2001 and 2011, before the launch of New Frontiers, DIT Hothouse, the incubation centre at DIT, operated
21 12-month venture programmes that provided entrepreneurs with professional expertise, incubation facilities and
mentoring. The aim was to develop successful companies
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Table 5. Incubation support provided through New Frontiers,
phase 2.
1. Training in all areas of business including financial management,
market research and validation, business models, patenting,
product development, business development and sales.
2. Personalized hands-on support, advice and mentoring from
experienced business advisers and practitioners.
3. Peer group learning from participants in the region and across
the country.
4. Office space and other business incubation facilities
5. Funding stipend of up to €15,000.
6. Networking opportunities with other entrepreneurs and
business development agencies.
7. Introductions to seed and early stage capital investment
networks.
8. Access to entrepreneurship best practice – both national and
international.
9. Expertise from HE institutes and the supportive environment of
their BICs.
10. Access to the expertise in Enterprise Ireland through its
Market Research Centre.
Source: Enterprise Ireland, 2015.
Note: BIC: Business Incubation Centre; HE: higher education.

Table 6. DIT hothouse venture programme outcomes
(2001–2011).
Outcome

Trading Acquired

Total
171
Percentage/ 62.9%
per
participant
(pp)

8
2.9%

Investment Sustainable Jobs
raised
businesses created
€87 million
€322,235 pp

179
65.8%

1055
3.88 pp

Source: DIT Hothouse (2011).

for the global market. The key outcomes of the Hothouse
venture programmes included 91 of the 272 programme
participants (33.45%) subsequently became Enterprise Ireland HPSU clients and 37 of the 272 participants (13.6%)
became County Enterprise Board (CEB) clients (DIT Hothouse, 2015: 19). The following achievements are noteworthy (see also Table 6):
 Firm survival rate: The Hothouse Incubation Programme had a firm survival rate of 62.9%, with 272
incubated firms still trading as at October 2012. Calvino et al. determined that the average survival rate
for firms was ‘just above 60 per cent after 3 years, 50
per cent after 5 years, and just over 40 per cent after
7 years’ (Calvino et al., 2015: 6). Considering that a
further eight of the incubated firms were subsequently acquired, this brings the total of sustainable
businesses to 179, representing 65.8% survival.
 Firm job creation: With 272 programme graduates
creating a total of 1055 jobs, just under four jobs

were created per incubated firm. This amounts to a
cost of roughly €3800 per job based on a total expenditure of approximately €5 million over the period –
a figure that appears to compare favourably to the
average Enterprise Ireland cost per job of €6721,
measured over the 7-year period from 2001 to
2007 (Enterprise Ireland, 2014: 59).
 Private investment raised: Raising investment poses
a significant challenge for start-up companies, with
the typical SME facing an ‘equity gap’ or ‘shortage
of risk capital investment’ (Gualandri and schwizer,
2008: 29) in the range of £250,000–£1 million,
according to Deakins and Freel (2012: 166–167).
The average outside equity raised by Hothouse participants was €322,235.
DIT Hothouse therefore had a significant track record of
achievement in the incubator domain before New Frontiers
was launched as the national programme in 2012. It is
important to bear this in mind when considering the Hothouse performance. Against this backdrop, it is appropriate
now to look at the experience of incubatees in the New
Frontiers programme.

Multiple case analysis of New Frontiers incubatees in
DIT hothouse
To determine the most appropriate theoretical sample for
the multiple case analysis, secondary information on all 32
Hothouse New Frontiers 2012 programme graduates was
reviewed. The 32 cases were analysed collectively in an
attempt to identify an appropriate ‘theoretical sample’
(Eisenhardt, 1989), which would help to highlight ‘transparently observable’ contrasts between participants (Pettigrew, 1990).
The final case study sample consisted of three graduates from each of the two 2012 cohorts (six in total), three
of whom were currently still trading and classified as
‘Surviving Firms and Entrepreneurs’ for the purposes of
this study. The remaining three firms were not currently
trading and were therefore classified as ‘Ceased Firms and
Entrepreneurs’. The sample was deemed to be representative of the two cohorts (Martinson and O’Brien, 2010) in
that it enabled direct comparison between surviving and
ceased firms.
Interviews undertaken with all six programme participants followed a similar semi-structured format and the
topic list was based on the key theoretical determinants
of and influences on firm growth as suggested by Storey
(1994) and Smallbone and Wyer (2012). Additional studies
on the same topic, such as those by Dobbs and Hamilton
(2007), Hansen and Hamilton (2011) and Barrow et al.
(2011) also influenced the questions and framing of the
topic list guide. Finally, the findings of incubator performance studies, such as those by Voisey et al. (2006) and
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Table 7. Profiles of New Frontiers entrepreneurs and firms participating in study.
Surviving firms
Case

A9

Age range
35–40
Current role CEO and Head
of Sales
Gender
Male
Nationality
Irish
Education
Master’s
degree
Key
Creativity,
motivators
control, selfachievement

Ceased firms

B3

B4

A3

35–40
CEO

29–34
Managing Director

20–25
Chief Technology
Officer
Male
Irish
Bachelor’s degree

B2

B6

Pre-start-up
Number of
founders
Management
experience
Sector
experience
Prior
business
Family
history
Business
networks
Involvement
with other
companies

Employee
One

Employee
Two

45–50
IT Program
Manager
Male
Male
Irish
Irish
Junior certificate –
Bachelor’s
Second level education
degree
Personal freedom and
Solving a problem/ Ambition to run
control
lifestyle
a selfemployed
business
Self-employed
Student
Entrepreneur
One
Three
Two

2 years

No

7 years

No

11 years

8 years

10 years

5 years

13 years

3 years

14 years

9 years

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Advisory roles No

Non-active directorships Advisor to some
start-ups

External
advisors
Leadership
style

Yes

Yes

Yes, but limited
activity
Two external
directorships
at the time
(portfolio)
Yes

Culture

Legal form at
entry
Current
status
Incorporated
Location
Sector

Male
Irish
Bachelor’s
degree
Wealth and
financial
freedom

Yes

No

Unlimited

Limited

Target oriented
Adaptive, but
generally handsoff with
experienced
staff
Positive, fun workplace – Easy going, casual Tense, nonbut focused
cooperative
Family, ethics, respect,
positivity (company
values)
Limited
Unlimited
Limited

Limited

Limited

Limited

May 2013
Dublin
Software

February 2011
Dublin
Software

November 2011
Dublin
Construction

Laissez-faire

Situational, a
blend of
autocratic
and
participative
Open,
Collaborative,
collaborative
innovative,
open

Dictatorial at times but
becoming more
participative

Limited (dormant) Limited
(dormant)
November 2013 September 2008
Dublin
Dublin
Software
Software

29–34
Global Sales
Director
Male
Australian
Master’s degree
Opportunity/
personal
freedom
Employee
Three

Actively involved
with multiple
start-ups
(portfolio)
No
Hands-on,
participative

Dissolved

Very free and
open, passive

Limited

February 2012
Dublin
Software

Source: Interviews with participants on DIT Hothouse New Frontiers programme.

Onofrei and Stephens (2011), discussions with key informants such as the Hothouse incubation centre manager and
a review of previous incubator research also informed the
programme-related questions. A summary of the participant profiles, derived from the topic list and secondary
data, is provided in Table 7.

Following a detailed review of the six individual case
reports, a ‘data reduction’ (Caudle, 2004: 421) process was
undertaken. This involved categorizing, tabulating, summarizing, comparing and contrasting all information into
‘data displays’ to enable the identification of patterns and
key themes (Caudle, 2004: 421). Table 8 presents an
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Table 8. Did incubation contribute to the growth and development of your firm.
Incubator contribution to business
Surviving firms

Ceased firms

A9: The practical and hands-on elements of the programme helped A3: The participant did not think the business ‘would have
followed on at all’ if it had not been for acceptance for New
the company’s growth. ‘“How can we help to get you further
Frontiers. However, he feels ‘the Company hasn’t benefited
along the road faster with that?” When that was demonstrated
from it so much’ given performance.
in the workshops or by the mentors that really did help’.
B2: ‘I knew what the [business] problem was going to be but I
B3: Hothouse provided academic knowledge to perform the
didn’t really know how to structure the growth strategy or an
various tasks required to run a business. ‘It gave me the training
investment strategy’. This is where Hothouse added value.
and the practical skills and encouragement to execute [those
tasks]’. He doubts whether he would have had the confidence to B6: The participant advised that they had ‘already set up the
company’ and begun trading, so support was limited from an
start the business, stating ‘Without that external credibility and
acceleration point of view. However, he feels the company
validation I would have doubted myself [ . . . ] I would have gone
benefitted from an improved networking ability and were
back to my paid job’.
motivated through the ‘positive energy’ of start-ups, as well as
B4: Networking was key benefit. ‘New Frontiers contributed
inspirational talks from guest speakers.
significantly [ . . . ] meeting DD was huge part of success [ . . . ]
wouldn’t be where it is now if it wasn’t for DD [ . . . ] reason
we’ve got out of small start-up phase is network of people we’ve
built’.
Source: Interviews with participants in DIT Hothouse New Frontiers programme.

example of one of the displays of the primary data developed during the study.
The final stage in the research process was to compare the
‘actual findings’ (explained in this section) in the master
case, embedded case and multiple case analysis of incubatee
experiences to the logic model and ToC (see Figure 1). This
comparison draws attention to the role (in practice and theory) of the incubation process in helping to explain actual
incubation outcomes (Hackett and Dilts, 2004a, 2004b).

Discussion of exploratory findings
The secondary data gathered for this research show that
technology incubation is a growing global phenomenon.
It has accelerated sharply since the ‘dot-com’ era in
2000. While new campus incubators continue to be a
favoured micropolicy intervention for governments
attempting to increase levels of technology-driven entrepreneurship, it is not immediately obvious from the literature what services or supports should be provided. Indeed,
the empirical evidence to date justifying the proliferation of
incubators is weak. This is not to say that campus incubators do not or cannot add value to the growth and development of fledgling firms or entrepreneurial learning – but, to
date, we do not have strong empirical evidence to suggest
that they do. This is due in part to the methodological and
data-related challenges encountered in researching this
area. This unsatisfactory situation is exacerbated by the
lack of independent reporting of incubator performance
and, indeed, by the lack of consensus on what ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ metrics to report on. It is hard to see how governments can justify investment in this domain and claim to
be making ‘evidence-based’ policy given the current

dearth of reliable and comparative data or rigorous independent evaluation. It would seem that a ‘herd mentality’
has taken hold in enterprise policymaking circles globally
since 2000 – particularly in relation to technology
incubation.
Although the growth trajectories of each of the six cases
analysed in the multiple case analysis were idiosyncratic
(as expected), a number of common themes emerged during the analysis of the interviews and supporting secondary
data. When the development of the three successful and
three unsuccessful firms was considered in light of the ToC,
a number of significant differences emerged. In particular,
the three trading firms appeared to have had a more developed technological offering (value proposition) than the
three companies that had recently ceased trading. The surviving firms seemed to have benefitted from the establishment of a ‘balanced’ management team from the outset of
the venture. This increased the absorptive capacity (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990) of the leadership team, thereby
increasing the resilience (and longevity) of the venture.
These firms appear to have derived more benefit from the
incubation programme than those participants who subsequently returned to paid employment. Through a combination of buffering and bridging processes – mentoring,
training and networking activities – incubation was perceived to have positively influenced the growth and development of the surviving firms. This was achieved,
according to the interviewees, by improving the skills and
ability of the owner-managers to develop and implement
niche market strategies, to delegate authority and responsibility, to internationalize, to create innovative technologies and to develop formal planning processes. While the
quality of the incubation processes appears to be a factor in
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improving incubation outcomes, the quality of the selected
entrepreneurs remains the most important input into the
incubation process. Further research is required to develop
robust selection processes, which will improve the chances
of selecting candidates with an appropriate profile and so
achieve better incubation outputs, outcomes and impacts.
As data availability builds over time on technology incubation, more sophisticated descriptive and explanatory
research can be conducted, which will allow for the difficult issue of ‘selection bias’ to be addressed.
The programme-related factors that were perceived to
be most beneficial for participants were one-to-one mentoring, strategy workshops and financial management training. However, on the least beneficial aspects of the
incubation process, opinions diverged between the surviving and ceased firms. The latter considered the networking
activities, such as events and introductions, to be least
important in terms of the role they played in influencing
their entrepreneurial and professional development,
whereas the surviving firms placed a high value on these
activities.

Industry and Higher Education 32(4)
uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of and justification
for enterprise micropolicy interventions in general. While
the methodological and data-related challenges in this area
are significant, it would seem nevertheless that longitudinal
mixed and/or multi-research methods nested in TBE
approaches can make a significant contribution to the quality and rigour of future studies in the domain. This in turn
could lead to improved enterprise policy learning and, consequently, the implementation of appropriate evidencebased enterprise policies.
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